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Constitutional review is the activity of measuring action choices
of governments against a pre-existing set of publicly known or
ascertainable, "higher" norms for the conduct of government.'
Anyone can do it: chief executives pondering vetoes or preparing
state messages; legislators contemplating legal change; police chiefs
reviewing department manuals; school board members debating
curriculum guides; city planners routing highway expansions;
citizens lobbying and pundits castigating any or all of the above;
dinner partners talking politics; candidates running for office; voters
turning out rascals. "American-style judicial review," let us say, is
constitutional review conducted by a nonpopular, unelected, life-
tenured body, whose decisions, considered legally binding on other
officials, are not reversible by any other set of political actors, except
in extraordinary political mobilizations under rules deliberately
designed to keep them few and far between.2 "Popular government,"
by contrast, is lawmaking and administration by officials replace-
able in popular-majoritarian elections over relatively short spans of
two, four, or six years. Mark Tushnet's Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts3 enters a longstanding American debate over
whether American-style judicial review of the lawmaking and other
acts of popular government (hereafter just "judicial review") is a
desirable feature in our political arrangements.
* RobertWalmsleyUniversity Professor, HarvardUniversity. I am indebted to Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Lawrence Sager, and Mark Tushnet for helpful comments on a draft of this
essay.
1. I write "action choices" rather than actions in order to allow for constitutional norms
that require (not just prohibit) government action of certain kinds, in certain circumstances.
2. See, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, ConstitutionalAmendmentitis, AA .PROSPECT, Fall 1995,
at 20, 20.
3. MARKTUSHNET, TAXING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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One can easily imagine a culture and practice of constitutional
review by chief executives, legislators, police chiefs, school boards,
city planners, candidates, pundits, and citizens, from which judicial
review is entirely missing. Such a culture and practice is what
Tushnet calls "populist constitutional law."4 Over the course of his
carefully plotted book, Tushnet develops a multipronged argument-I
suspect the completest that has ever been produced-that we would
probably be better off with populist constitutional law disencum-
bered of judicial review and its "overhang."5 The argument is rich,
complex, qualified, and detailed. In its broadest outline, though, it
is simple and easy to grasp. It's the standard form of practical
argument in which a background normative preference grounds a
default position-one that might, in principle, be overcome by other
concededly relevant considerations but, as matters turn out and as
the argument is designed to show, is not. In Tushnet's book, the
background preference is for democracy,6 the immediately implied
default position is against judicial review, and the ultimately
unsuccessful counter-considerations are "constitutional values."7
B. The Thin Constitution
Suppose you readily accept the most general premises of
Tushnet's argument: A due concern for constitutional values might
save judicial review from condemnation by a default preference for
democracy, but nothing else can. Suppose, further, that the two of
you agree perfectly in your practical predictions of what would
happen without judicial review. You and he could still disagree on
the argument's outcome, if you and he meant quite different things
by "constitutional values." For example, you could both agree that
his "constitutional values" would be as safe without judicial review
as with it, whereas your "constitutional values" would not be. In
4. See id. at 9.
5. "Judicial overhang" is Tushnet's term for the distortive effects of judicial review on
populist constitutional law, as currently practiced or imagined, and the fact that it currently
occurs "in the court's shadow."Id. at 55. If, for example, congressional leaders were to offer
"the Supreme Court won't allow it" as a reason for opposing the McCain-Feingold campaign
reform bill, that would be an instance of the judicial overhang at work (regardless of whether
it was a sincere explanation). See id. at 57-65.
6. See, e.g., id. at 31 ("A populist constitutional law rests on a commitment to democracy
7. See id. at 96 (arguing that if we have in place "self-enforcing institutional
arrangements" that can be relied on to advance "constitutional values," then "we can [safely,
prudently] take the Constitution away from the courts").
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that case, you might want to keep judicial review in force, whereas
he would certainly want to junk it. In sum: in order properly to
gauge the appeal of Tushnet's argument, we have to know exactly
what he means by "constitutional values." For that purpose, We need
before us Tushnet's idea of "the thin Constitution."'
The thin Constitution, as Tushnet defines it, consists not of
canonical or technical rules and standards that lawyers peculiarly
know as positive law, but rather of moral principles that everyone
American knows as incontestable.9 Here are five sorts of things the
thin Constitution, accordingly, does not include: first, the provisions
of the documentary Constitution dealing with the structures and
mechanics of government;' ° second, the canonical, formulaic texts of
the Bill of Rights; third, judge-made legal doctrine designed,
prudentially, to "implement" the thin Constitution; 2 fourth, judge-
made legal doctrine reporting the Court's views about the Constitu-
tion's substantive intentions, such as its strong bias against
"viewpoint-specific" restrictions of "expressive conduct" such as flag-
burning; 3 and, last but by no means least, any other resolutions,
reached from time to time by lawmakers or judges, of sincere and
reasonable disagreements about what is and is not permitted or
required by the abstract and general norms of the thin
Constitution. 4
"What, then, is the thin Constitution?" 5 It consists, as we said, of
moral principles. The principles are those of the Declaration of
Independence: "that all people [are] created equal, [and] that all
[have] inalienable rights;" alternatively, they are the Constitution's
"fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of expression, and
liberty."' 6 Note that, while Tushnet connects these principles and
guarantees historically to the Declaration and the Constitution, they
are, to all intents and purposes of lawyers, unwritten. As for the
Declaration, it is not positive law and never pretended to be. As for
8. See, e.g., id. at 9.
9. See id. at 11.
10. See id. at 9 (assigning these provisions to the "thick" Constitution).
11. See id. at 11 (stating that the thin Constitution is "[n]ot 'the First Amendment' or'the
equal protection clause'").
12. See id. at 10.
13. See id. at 11 (excluding from the thin Constitution "what the [Supreme] Court has
said about" the canonical clauses); infra text following note 85.
14. We'll have little to say about the last item until the end. See infra pp. 485-87.
15. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 11 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 11.
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the Constitution, it has no self-announced theory of what in it is and
is not fundamental; and, anyway, Tushnet's thin Constitution is
drawn mainly from the part of it that is not (or is least) positive law,
namely the Preamble. To speak more carefully, the thin Constitu-
tion draws from that in the Preamble which "resonate[s] with the
Declaration," that which commits the nation to the pursuit of
domestic Tranquility, the common defense, and the general Welfare,
all for the sake of Justice and the Blessings of Liberty. v Surely we
meet here the so-called "higher law" constitutionalism for which,
among American political leaders, Abraham Lincoln most lumi-
nously speaks, seconded from the trenches by such able scholars as
Edward Corwin and Thomas Grey.'8
Perhaps a little unexpectedly to some, Mark Tushnet appears in
his latest book as an unabashed natural-law constitutionalist. (Hugo
Black, who also flew populist colors, would have had him for lunch. 9
Or tried to.) Why ought citizens carry on "the Declaration's project"
as represented by the thin Constitution? Because, Tushnet says,
"the Declaration's principles state unassailable moral truths," as
well as because "the Declaration's project is what constitutes us as
a people."" Ronald Dworkin might have said it. 2 ' But there is a
further point, one about thinness, and one that you won't find in
Dworkin. In Tushnet's view, it is, very specifically, the thinness of
the thin Constitution that gives Americans striving to follow it the
opportunity to "construct an attractive narrative of American
aspiration;"22 a point to which we shall return, but not until the very
end.
17. Id. at 12.
18. For Tushnet's eloquent evocations ofLincoln, with an assist from Gary Jacobsohn, see
id. at 11-13. See also Edward Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American
Constitutionalism, 42 HARv. L. REV. 149 (1928-29); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the
Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 843 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(speaking, not flatteringly, of the Court's "natural-law-due-process formula").
20. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 31; see also id. at 50-51. Tushnet states that "populist
constitutional law... is a law committed to the principle of universal human rights justifiable
by reason in the service of self-government." Id. at 181. "We ought to take as our project
realizing the Declaration's principles because.., those principles are good ones." Id. at 193.
21. See RONALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 187-90, 211-15 (1996). I cannot resist the
recollection of my own one-time coupling of Dworkin with critical legal studies. See Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1513-15 (1988).
22. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 12.
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II. NATURAL LAW AND JuDIcIAL REVIEW
In countries where the practice of constitutional law obtains,
opinions differ about the point of the practice. Here is a very crude
classification. 23 "Positivist constitutionalism" is the view that the
point of the practice of constitutional law is, simply, compliance with
duly enacted law-the Constitution-that deserves, as such, our
fidelity.' "Natural-law constitutionalism" is the view that the point
of the practice is the realization in our public life of moral values,
accessible to reason but transcending any legal text or corpusjuris.25
Of course, the opposition is not really so stark and clean as that.
Thoughtful positivists stand ready with moral reasons to support
their claim of an obligation of fidelity to the Constitution.2 1 Thought-
ful natural lawyers concede their project is doomed if the positive
law is insufficiently receptive. Still, the two stances clearly differ
over the sources of those "publicly known or ascertainable... norms
for the conduct of government," as I have called them, that the
practice of constitutional review is supposed to make effective in the
actual conduct of political life.2" To speak again crudely: for
positivist constitutionalists, the norm-sources are all and only
written; for natural-law constitutionalists, at least some of the basic
23. Lawrence Sager distinguishes, along very similar lines, a"positive" and a"pragmatic-
justice" account of "the nature of the Constitution." Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain
Clothes:Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410,415 (1993).
According to the latter, "the aim of the constitutional enterprise as a whole is justice, and
constitutional discourse is political theory in plain clothes." Id.
24. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
25. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTrIUION 1-38 (1996) (describing, and advocating, the "moral reading" approach to
constitutional adjudication); IBRUCEACKERMAN, WETHEPEOPLE:FOUNDATIONS 10-16(1991)
(describing, but not embracing, "rights foundationalism). The text-transcending reason of
which I speak need not be conceived as free-floating from any and all local cultural
determinants, in order for the resulting view be a"natural law" view in the interesting sense.
See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 53 (commending the conclusion that "the people of the United
States are constituted by our commitment to the realization of universal human rights")
(emphasis added); see also id. at 191 (urging that "the people of the United States continue
to constitute ourselves by a commitment to universal human rights"); Ronald Dworkin,
Natural Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982); cf Frank I. Michelman, Morality,
Identity and "Constitutional Patriotism," 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1009 (1999).
26. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETHIcS 516, 517 (1994);
Frank I. Michelman & Margaret Jane Radin, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal
Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1024-26 (1991) (describing normative motivations and
orientations of brands of legal positivism).
27. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 36.
28. Supra p. 461.
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ones are, in the last analysis, unwritten (as, for example, in Mark
Tushnet's thin Constitution).
When, in American political life, positivist and natural-law
constitutionalists square off, what is it that they're sparring over?
Almost always, the bone of contention is the manner in which the
Supreme Court ought to exercise its power of review of the constitu-
tional propriety of government action choices. Positivists gravitate
to textualist and "originalist" approaches to the work of constitu-
tional adjudication. Natural lawyers, by contrast, insist on the
responsibility ofjudges to bring with them to the bench their powers
of moral reason and discernment, whether or not leavened with local
cultural knowledge.
For both sides, typically, judicial review itself is a forgone
conclusion. Still, we might ask which of the two parties is the more
directly and unhesitatingly committed to judicial review. Most ofus,
I think, would instinctively say the natural lawyers are. In the
contemporary United States, positivism is almost always democratic
positivism, tied to an unshakeable sense that the people of a country
have a right to be their own rulers. It seems that must include the
right to decide the content of their own constitutional laws-not only
the relatively abstract and general, canonical-textual formulations
of those laws (for example, "[n]o state shall .. deny to any person
• . . the equal protection of the laws"),29 but also the applied
meanings of those formulas when major contests over those
meanings arise (for example, regarding affirmative action). That
makes judicial review perennially problematic for democratic
positivists, because it is hard to maintain the position that, as
between the Supreme Court decidingAdarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena3 and Presidents and Congresses issuing the executive orders
and enacting the statutes there cast under a constitutional cloud,3'
the Supreme Court speaks more authentically for the people. Doing
so is not impossible, but it requires some pretty strenuous work,
along the lines of Bruce Ackerman's going-on-seventeen-year-old
campaign on behalf of "dualist democracy."32
29. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
30. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
31. By its de facto overruling of Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the
Court in Adarand cast grave doubt on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress. See
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
32. See Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1022 (1984).
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By contrast, the idea of requiring governmental action choices to
pass muster before an independent judiciary recommends itself
straightforwardly-or so it has seemed to do-to those who believe
that moral reason, as opposed to sheer political will, is what ought
finally to decide many constitutional-legal controversies. Again, an
opposite view is not impossible to conceive. Granting that constitu-
tional questions ought to be decided as matters of fresh moral
judgment, not as matters of present political preference or of the
translation of frozen, past expressions of judgment or preference,
one can still maintain that the exercise of the pertinent moral
reason belongs by right to the people and not to any bevy of Platonic
guardians.33 But, still, confession to a natural-law, as opposed to a
democratic-positivist, view of the point of constitutional review looks
like an admission against interest for an advocate of dethronement
of the independent judiciary from its present place of dominance
over American constitutional law.
It would be, then, at least mildly interesting to find an argument
for dethronement that affirmatively and specifically relied on a
natural-law, as opposed to a democratic-positivist, stance regarding
the ultimate sources of constitutional law-or, let us say, of constitu-
tional values. More stunning would be an argument for judicial
dethronement that necessitates the natural-law attitude-necessi-
tates it because, as the author is at pains to show, the opposite,
democratic-positivist assumptions would defeat the argument. We're
talking now about an argument that runs from democracy-based
opposition to judicial review to a conclusion that constitutional
values, therefore, must be seen to have their roots in trans-political
(I do not say trans-temporal) reason, not in identifiable events of
democratic political decision-making. That is something that none
of us, I'll bet, had ever expected to meet in our lifetimes. And that is
what Mark Tushnet has given us. It is one feature of his book-not
the only one-that makes it so adventurous, and so interesting.
Tushnet's notion of "constitutional values"-or, to speak more
carefully, of the constitutional values whose vindication or advance-
ment ought to concern us when we weigh the merits and demerits
ofjudicial review-is, we have seen, distinctly a natural-law notion.
33. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 181-82 (offering this as the historic and traditional
American self-understanding); see also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
For the "Guardians," see LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 56-77 (1958).
20001
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:461
His constitutional values are the values spoken for by the "thin"
Constitution.34 The thin Constitution keeps thin by being natural-
law. If it weren't the latter, it couldn't be the former; an American-
positivist constitution necessarily would be, in Tushnet's terms,
"thick." And, as Tushnet is the first to say, "the thinness of the
populist Constitution" is most definitely "essential" to the credibility
of his case against judicial review.
Thus endeth the lesson. The rest is commentary.
III. A SKETCH OF TUSHNET'S ARGUMENT AGAINST JUDICIAL
REVIEW
A. The Democratic Default 6
In Tushnet's case against judicial review, the background
normative preference is for democracy, meaning popular self-
government or what Lincoln called "government... by the people."37
Tushnet does not argue for this preference; he takes it to be
something already shared between him and his audience. If you do
not share it, his argument can have no force for you. Conversely, if
you do share it, then maybe Tushnet already has you on the
run-because then, it would seem, "no thanks" must be the resulting
default position regarding judicial review. Other relevant consider-
ations being equal or indecisive, it would seem, we would have to
reject judicial review because it is obviously and directly at odds
with the background preference for democracy.
B. A Wide Conception of Democracy
The full truth is not so simple. You can't infer "no judicial review,"
even as a rebuttable default, from a background commitment to
democracy, unless and until you have first made sure that the
34. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 11-12, 181-82 (identifying the "thin" and "populist"
constitutions).
35. Id. at 13; see also id. at 113 ("The Constitution outside the courts should be a thin
Constitution if it is to be self-enforcing through a political process that combines structure-
based and value-based incentives.").
36. Cf DWORlN, supra note 25, at 15-16 (describing a "majoritarian premise" whereby
the community ought generally to abide by the decisions of the majority of its citizens).
37. 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 23 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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question of democracy's existence in your country is, in practice,
cleanly separable from the question of judicial review's existence
there. If you, as an American, think democracy's existence in the
United States in any degree depends, as a practical matter, on
judicial review's existence here, then you can't, without tripping
over yourself, move from a preference for democracy even to a
provisional, rebuttable rejection ofjudicial review. I keep saying "in
practice" and "as a practical matter," because democracy's existence
in a country surely does depend conceptually on the effective
honoring in that country of certain kinds of constitutional rights
that courts make it their business to enforce, most obviously rights
of political expression and association and of equality of political
franchise.3" Tushnet, himself, affirms the conceptual tie between
democracy and rights of this kind.39 How, then, can he step from a
prodemocratic premise to an anti-judicial review default stance?
The answer lies in the realm of fact, not of theory. (Tushnet,
adm.irably, writes in this book as much as a political scientist as he
does as a legal and political theorist.) In theory, there are outer
limits of what constitutes a democratic form and practice of
government, and some of those limits doubtless consist of rights of
the people that "legislative majorities are to respect."" In fact, in the
United States, those outer limits are as safe against transgression
without judicial review as with it, or so Tushnet contends.4' Thanks
to a political culture that gives "powerful" support to the basic rights
of democratic citizens, there are few "real" problems in America
today respecting disfranchisement, thought control, and censorship
of antigovernment expression,' and no realistically imaginable
American political resolution of a constitutional question will cross
the outer bounds of democracy.
Notice how this claim's plausibility depends on pushing those
outer bounds pretty far out. To take the obvious contemporary
examples, the claim means that democracy will be in force in
America no matter how American legislatures, out from under the
judicial overhang, might realistically be imagined to treat the
matters of term limits and campaign-expenditure caps. If the
38. See generally DwORErN, supra note 25, at 1-38; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw (1980).
39. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 157-58.
40. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LBERALISM 227 (2d ed. 1996).
41. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 30-32.
42. See id. at 158.
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legislature in State A decides that the Constitution allows a fairly
strict limit or cap and then proceeds to enact it, democracy is
nonetheless in force in State A. If, at the same time, the legislature
in State B decides that the Constitution prohibits any limit or cap
at all, and for that reason refrains from enacting any, democracy is
also nonetheless in force in State B. The same is true if legislatures
in the United States simultaneously divide, as doubtless they would
if freed of the judicial overhang, over whether the Constitution
permits criminalization of flag-burning,43 numerical over-represen-
tation in the state legislature of sparsely populated rural districts,"
legislative districting designed to guarantee the return of a repre-
sentative number ofAfrican-Americans," 5 punishment of racist hate
speech,46 prohibition of unsigned political leaflets,47 liability for
negligent and damaging falsehoods about public figures, 48 ballot-
access restrictions designed to protect "political stability,"49 or
exclusion of paid signature gatherers from initiative and referendum
activities5 0-all of those being constitutional questions that the
Supreme Court has resolved on grounds at least tinged with a
concern for the requirements of true democracy. In Tushnet's view,
any concatenation of answers to questions like these (and the list
could go on and on) leaves democracy standing intact. In other
words, Tushnet's democracy is a big tent. It just about has to be
more spacious than that of any judge, scholar, or party to constitu-
tional litigation who has ever argued or defended a constitutional-
legal position in terms of what democracy means or requires.
Inevitably, someone will ask: Suppose some legislature enacts a
$50-per-candidacy cap on campaign expenditures, and does so
precisely because its members believe the measure will guarantee
lifetime reelection to incumbents. Would democracy then still be in
force? Tushnet's answer would be twofold: First, democracy would
still be in force, because the enacters' incumbency-protection belief
would be false. Campaign cap or no, word of what the legislators
had done would easily get around, and American voters would take
43. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
44. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
45. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
46. See RA.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); cf Hudnut v. American Booksellers, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
47. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
48. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1969).
49. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
50. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
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the first opportunity to throw the traitors out and elect a new
government pledged to undo the dirty work.51 Alternatively, if that
is not so, then nothing can save us anyway, certainly not judicial
review.52 But now we are speeding too fast ahead of our story.
C. Overcoming the Democratic Default: Advancement of
Constitutional Values
Tushnet does not believe that democracy is the only consideration
bearing on our appraisals of judicial review. Supposing democracy
to be practically secure in the United States, with or without judicial
review in force, there are still other "constitutional values" to worry
about.53 Because there are, it remains possible, in theory, to defend
judicial review by showing that its positive contribution to the
"advancement" of the other constitutional values outweighs or
otherwise overrides its cost to democracy. Obviously, that case rides
on the strength of our belief in the contribution judicial review
makes to constitutional-values advancement. If we can't conclude
with some confidence that constitutional values are measurably
better served in the presence than in the absence of judicial
review-if the one and only "clear" effect of abolition would be to
return constitutional decision-making from the judges to the
people-should not the democratic default lead us to reject judicial
review?
54
Maybe not. Suppose the effects wouldn't be completely clear.
Suppose we couldn't be absolutely certain that judicial review
doesn't do at least a little better for the other constitutional values
than populist constitutional law would do. And suppose we were
absolutely certain that we can't do worse for the other values with
judicial review in force. That combination of estimates strikes many
people as highly sensible, even logically compelled. It seems to them
51. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 66 ("Candidates for office ... would want to take
constitutional rights seriously when the people themselves care deeply about constitutional
rights.").
52. See id. at 71 ('[Ilt seems wildly unlikely that the courts can save us from ourselves.");
cf Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE SPIRIT
OF LIBERTY 155, 164 (Irving Dillard ed., 1977) ("[A] society so riven that the spirit of
moderation is gone, no court can save; a society where that spirit flourishes, no court need
save . . . ."); ELY, supra note 38, at 182-83 (strongly discounting the threat of anti-
cholecystotomy laws).
53. See supra note 7.
54. See TUSENET, supra note 3, at 154.
20001
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:461
that adding a judicial review filter can only increase, and cannot
decrease, effective protection against violations of the other
constitutional values. That is because they think the other values all
concern fears about what the government might do to us. If so, an
extra barrier against government action can only advance the other
values and cannot possibly set them back. A perception of that kind,
set against a background preference for democracy, makes the
choice for or against judicial review depend, always imponderably,
on how we weigh the absolute certainty of some loss of democracy
against the virtual certainty of some net loss of the other values.
In Tushnet's view, the choice is not so fathomlessly uncertain as
that. He is relentless on the point that judicial review carries its
own risk of mistakes, offsetting the risk of mistakes we surely run
without it. The idea that adding constitutional-review filters can't
possibly increase, but can only decrease, the net total of
constitutional-value losses, is patently false. "'Keep the government
out of here, there, and everywhere,'" Tushnet truly says-I wish he
had mentioned the Preamble right there-is an idea that "[1]iberals
cannot like."55 Advancement of liberal constitutional values often
requires government action. Equal citizenship regardless of race is
a constitutional value for Tushnet-as for us all?-and its realization,
in today's United States, almost certainly requires the enactment
and enforcement of civil rights laws. 6 Yet it is not all that difficult
to see such laws as prohibited infringements on constitutionally
protected privacy and property rights.5" When and as the Supreme
Court should have happened to do so, mistakenly, the judicial filter
would have lessened, not increased, satisfaction of constitutional
values.5" As Tushnet says, "We buy judicial review wholesale."59 The
55. Id. at 133.
56. Cf S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1996) ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), §§ 9(1) ("Everyone is
equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law."), 9(2)
("Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of a rights and freedoms. To promote the
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.").
57. See, e.g, United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1561 (8th Cir. 1983)
(Richard Arnold, J.) (holding unconstitutional, as applied to the Jaycees' males-only
membership rules, Minnesota's law prohibiting sex discrimination in "places of public
accommodation"), rev'd sub nom. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984);
RIcHARD A. EPsTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAWS (1992).
58. See, e.g.,TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 96 ("Judges are not perfect.... They can find a
constitutional right where the Constitution does not create one."); cf id. at 126 (discussing
instances in which courts, by "overenforc[ing]" certain values, "depriv[e] the people of our
power to govern ourselves without promoting any value the Constitution actually seeks to
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price of Brown v. Board of Education' may be "Supreme Court
decisions restricting affirmative action and campaign finance
reform."61
For present purposes, we need not rehearse and appraise in
detail Tushnet's case against judicial review. It's enough to observe
that, using lines of argument of the kinds I have been sketching,
Tushnet does arrive at the conclusion that we can't conclude with
any confidence that constitutional values are measurably better
served in the presence than in the absence of judicial review and
that the democratic default, therefore, should lead us to reject
judicial review.
D. "Incentive-Compatibility" 62 and Citizens' Values
The case proceeds with an eye on both pans of the balance. On the
one side, Tushnet argues that courts make mistakes about constitu-
tional values, as one indeed would have to expect.63 On the other
side, he argues that constitutional values are safer with popular
politics than Americans have taught themselves to believe. 64 Let us
focus, now, on the latter line of argument. At its core is the claim
that constitutional values, by and large, are parts of an incentive-
compatible arrangement of political institutions and practices. An
incentive-compatible arrangement is one that is self-enforcing
without external policing, given the motivations that can be
expected to operate on participants in the arrangement. Tushnet's
homely example is an automobile dealership's contractual arrange-
ment with members of the sales force for payment of a large bonus
to the one who sells the most volume over a period of time.65 The
boss devises this scheme to take the place of inevitably vain
attempts by herself to oversee directly the sales efforts exerted by
each member. True, the scheme won't work unless the salespeople
can be reasonably sure the bonus really will be paid to the one who
earns it under the rule, and we can ask what would give them the
promote").
59. Id. at 141.
60. 344 U.S. 1 (1952).
61. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 141.
62. Id. at 95.
63. See id. at 96.
64. See id. at 121.
65. See id. at 95-96.
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needed assurance if there were no courts and police around to
"enforce" the contract. Tushnet's answer is that the arrangement is
self-enforcing because of everyone's knowledge that the employment
market (not to mention the auto sales market) will punish the boss
severely if she renegs on her deals with the sales force.66
Similarly, Tushnet argues, public officeholders who flout, say,
Bill-of-Rights values can count on being punished in the vote-market
by an electorate displeased by the flouting.6" True, again, that won't
work unless a basic respect for the rules about voting-more broadly,
for the structural provisions of the Constitution-is itself guaranteed,
and don't we need the courts to guarantee at least that much?
Tushnet's answer is that we don't, because there are lines clearly
defining the outer limits of tolerance of the American social contract
for democratic government, and officeholders will be stopped from
crossing those lines by some combination of shame, fear of popular
reprisal that will find some way to effect itself, and their own,
internalized, cognitive commitments to democratic values.68 (As we
have already noticed, Tushnet combines this with a familiar theme
in the American historical lexicon of anti-judicial review polemics,
that if we ever reach the point where the mentioned combination of
deterrents will not work, there's nothing left of the Great Republic
that's worth a judiciary's saving, anyway. 69)
The Constitution's incentive-compatibility arises from complex
layerings of what Tushnet calls "structure-based" and "Value-based"
incentives. ° The voters' readiness to rally to the defense of Bill-of-
Rights substance is a value-based incentive. The officeholder's fear
of crossing the voters is a structure-based incentive. The
officeholder's refusal to transgress the outer bounds of a democratic-
republican system of government reflects a mix of both kinds of
incentive. The structure-based component of the mix in turn
66. See id. at 96. We can keep asking, of course-this time, whether judicial enforcement
of the most basic rules of property and contract isn't required to keep these markets up and
running. Tushnet's response would be: Maybe, but we don't need anything like constitutional
law, taking precedence over common law and statute law, to assure ourselves of that. Vide
the case of Britain, from the memory of humankind runneth not to the contrary to the present
day.
67. See id. at 66.
68. See, e.g., id. at 106-07 (observing that what reliably stops Senators from "deny[ing]
fundamental fairness in impeachment trials" isn't the Constitution's mandate to the Senate
to "try" impeachments, but rather is the "[S]enators' commitments to constitutional values
in themselves").
69. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
70. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 108.
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responds to a value-based incentive, the voters' presumed devotion
to the ideal of democratic-republican government.71 Plainly, the
value-based incentives of the voters (to whom-as to the judiciary-no
structure-based incentives apply) are foundational in this model;
without them, the model collapses. In sum-glossing over much of
what is of enormous interest in Tushnet's book-Tushnet's argument
that we do not need judicial review to guarantee the advancement
of constitutional values rests crucially on the claim that the value-
based incentives of the citizenry support a no less reliable, incentive-
compatible structure of assurances.
IV. THICK AND THIN: SORTING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
A. Too Many Values72
Obviously, the plausibility of that claim is going to vary with
exactly what we include in the set of constitutional values to be
concerned about. Suppose we take those values to include the
effectuation of the Constitution's dictates regarding such housekeep-
ing matters as the legislative veto, or even such arguably hotter,
structural issues as the suability of states for violations of congres-
sional regulations of commerce. In both those fields, Congress got
away with repeated violations over extended periods73-habits of
infraction that, for all anyone knows, would have lasted forever had
the judiciary not at length stepped in to "enforce" what it now tells
us are the pertinent, contrary commands of the Constitution.
74
The problem is not avoided, it is only sharpened, if we focus the
idea of "constitutional values" on substantive concerns about human
needs and interests that we think ought to shape and direct the
powers of government as a whole. In American constitutional law,
those concerns about human needs and interests find expression at
71. See id. at 66 ("[Representatives once elected, would want to take constitutional rights
seriously when the people themselves care deeply about constitutional rights.").
72. I was thinking of Joseph Irs wondrous critique of Mozartes music. See PETER
SHAFFER, AMADEUS 29 (1981).
73. Cf TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 101 (remarking that United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995), "certainly supports skepticism about the self-enforceability of federalism").
74. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2269 (1999) (holding that states enjoy
sovereign immunity from suits for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that section of Immigration and Nationality Act
that authorized one House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate a decision of the Executive
Branch was unconstitutional).
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various levels of generality and abstraction. There is, for example,
the level of the text, where constitutional values would seem to
include "the free exercise [of religion],"" "the freedom ... of the
press,"7 6 and the absence from our lives of "unreasonable searches"77
and "cruel and unusual punishments.""8 Do locutions of that kind
compose any part of the catalogue of the "constitutional values"
we're supposed to be concerned about advancing? If so, why stop
there? How about the more concrete and contextualized set of aims
and ideals for the conduct of government that we find laid down by
judge-made constitutional law, the teachings of the United States
Reports regarding such matters as laws restricting free expression,
allegedly for wholly commendable reasons unrelated to message
content-public nudity laws, for example, as applied to paid enter-
tainment? 9 If those judge-identified aims and ideals count as
"constitutional values," then Tushnet's incentive-compatibility claim
is in serious difficulty, because, obviously, we can't rely on value-
based incentives of the citizenry to keep lawmakers faithful to
constitutional values conceived at that level of refinement. To take
a fairly extreme and striking example, we can't depend on the
electorate to punish the first post-hangover legislature to enact a
flag-desecration law like the ones held unconstitutional in Texas v.
Johnson," and United States v. Eichman.8 '
It is true, as Tushnet points out, that large parts of the judge-
made corpus juris constitutionale consist of something rather
different from the judiciary's determinations of what the Constitu-
tion, in the service of basic human interest, finally requires of
American government.8 2 When, for example, the Supreme Court
tells lower courts to invalidate restrictions on expressive conduct
(burning a draft card or a flag, for example), when and only when
the restrictions exceed what those courts find "essential to the
furtherance of' some "important or substantial governmental
interest,"8" the high court is not exactly and undilutedly reporting
its findings about the human interests and related constitutional
values implicated in the case-types under consideration. ("Not
75. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
76. Id.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
79. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
80. 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
81. 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990).
82. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 42-44.
83. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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overburdening expression any more than the judge will consider
necessary to vindicate a substantial state interest" is not plausibly
the name of a basic political value, for the defense of which Ameri-
cans "'would march [their] sons and daughters off to war.'"') The
Court then, almost certainly, is prescribing a set of prudential rules
for lower courts to follow (as well as for itself to follow in future
proceedings), in the belief that having courts follow those rules is
the best way to "implement" what it takes to be the pertinent
constitutional values."
But to say that not all of judicially produced, constitutional-legal
doctrine is a specification of constitutional values is not to say that
none of it is. In fact, a sizable fraction of it appears to be just that-a
report of the Court's relatively concrete and detailed views about
what the Constitution, in the service of human interest, really
"wants" in various sorts of contexts and situations. Thus, the Court
in the draft-card and flag cases very clearly purports to find out
something about what the Constitution wants that the parchment
itself does not spell out-that is, the Constitution wants the govern-
ment not to regulate expressive conduct at all, insofar as its
motivation to do so lies in dislike of the political or ideological stance
or message believed to be conveyed by the conduct in question.
Suppose we spoke of "the special obnoxiousness to liberty of
governmental restrictions on expression, when the latter are
prompted by political or ideological antipathy." Surely, we'd just
have spoken the name of a value, and one that we would ordinarily
think of as constitutional. Yet a fair reading of Tushnet's treatment
of these matters is that he does not regard a judicial determination
of constitutional meaning, at that level of concreteness or detail, to
be one that touches "constitutional values," at least not the kind
that should mainly concern us in our grand calculus of the costs and
benefits of judicial review.
B. Value-Trashing: A Road Not Taken
Tushnet could neatly have avoided all trouble of this sort, had he
been willing both to embrace a value-free notion of law and to make
84. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 11 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (Stevens, J.)).
85. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 43-44, 61, 161; Richard H. Falon, Jr., Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARv. L. REV. 54 (1997).
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constitutional "law," as opposed to "values," the object of concern. He
could have joined with those who say that the Constitution, as a
law, is fully in force as long as there are no violations of any
command demonstrably contained in its text. The strongest form of
this view would be that there is no such thing as the truth of the
matter about what any text says, or means, so as soon as we reach
the point where the slightest disagreement sets in, it's chacun el son
goat-from which it may be held to follow that, if there is an honestly
reported difference of goats concerning whether "the freedom of
speech" encompasses the torching of an American flag, national
constitutional law can have nothing to say about the permissibility
of statutes abridging activities falling under that description. A
weaker version, giving the same result, would be that, even if there
is a true answer to a question such as whether the First Amend-
ment prevents Congress or a state legislature from enacting a law
prohibiting flag-desecration, the truth of one or another proposed
answer is not the sort of thing that anyone can demonstrate to
anyone else by a cogent, logical argument drawing on nothing but
the text for its premises. That being so, it may be maintained,
obedience to the true answer ought not to be a part of anyone's legal
obligation, to be "enforced" by the courts and the police. 6
Adoption of either of those views would have allowed Tushnet to
say, for example, that his argument is not hurt by the fact that the
electorate probably wouldn't punish Congress or a state legislature
for enacting a flag-desecration statute. That's no problem, he could
then say, because such a statute, being not demonstrably prohibited
by the words of the Constitution, is not against the law of the
Constitution, and the Supreme Court's pretense of laying down that
it is, is an act of usurpation.
C. Tushnet's Constitutional-Legal Moralism
Happily, Tushnet wants nothing to do with arguments of that
kind. Tushnet is a constitutional-legal moralist. He thinks questions
of right and wrong in politics have answers that go beyond differ-
ences of opinion, that getting them right is something very much
worth caring about, and that this aim has a bearing on how rightly
to measure the constitutional permissibility of, for example, flag-
86. See Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er Nuthin": Formalism in Law and Morality,
66 U. CHi. L. REv. 530, 544-46, 549-51 (1999).
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desecration laws." He plainly thinks the Supreme Court has
measured right, in that instance.8 8 He nowhere asks us to assume
that populist constitutional law would do the same. "Of course," he
writes, "it is a fact that the people are not committed to the Constitu-
tion's principles as the courts have understood them."89
Generalizing-and I am reading between the lines, here-we may
doubt that Tushnet believes, and I do not read him as maintaining,
that judicial review gives us no better overall chance of getting
constitutional choices right, at this level of refinement, than we
would have without it." Flag-desecration laws, offensive to political
morality as they truly are, are still not in the class of events we have
mainly to be concerned about, namely, transgressions of the thin
Constitution.91 The world is not lost if people have to put up with
this degree of deviance from true, basic, political morality. "[A]
nation that enforces anti-flag-burning statutes" is not, on that
account, "Stalinist Russia."92 Tushnet's position is that any gain to
the overall cause of political-moral rightness by getting issues of this
relatively refined kind right rather than wrong, discounted by the
marginal increase in the probability of getting them right that
judicial review might credibly be thought to bring with it (and you
87. References abound in Tushnet's book to good and correct constitutional decisions, and
conversely to bad and mistaken ones. While such remarks crop up in sundry contexts, they
are all, obviously, meant sincerely, not ironically. I will give just a few citations here. See, e.g.,
TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 44 (explaining how use of formalist doctrines can increase the net
total of "correct decisions"); id. at 91 ("The legislator would act wrongly in following the
[religiously based, racist views of constituents] not because those views were religious but
because they were wrong."); id. at 96 (speaking ofjudges who find constitutional rights where
"the Constitution does not create one" or deny rights that "the Constitution actually
protects"); id. at 105 ('The Constitution is not indifferent as to the outcome of controversies
over what its words mean.").
88. See id. at 59 ('The federal Flag ProtectionAct was abad law... because [among other
defects] it was inconsistent with free speech principles. ... "); id. at 106 (opining that a ban
on flag burning is not "even a close case").
89. Id. at 70.
90. My reading has to be set beside Tushnet's own summation:
Sometimes the courts deviate a bit [from what the dominant national political
coalition wants], occasionally leading to better political outcomes and
occasionally leading to worse ones.... On balance, judicial review may have
some effect in offsetting legislators' inattention to constitutional values. The
effect is not obviously good, which makes us lucky that it is probably small
anyway.
Id. at 153.
91. See id. at 57 ('The real question is whether in general legislatures or courts make
more, and more important, constitutional mistakes."(emphasis added)).
92. Id. at 106; cf id. at 78 ("[A] liberal society guided by a thin Constitution can probably
putup withwhatever sorts ofpolitical actions religious believers take. The thin Constitution's
nonestablishment provision is thin indeed.").
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are allowed to assume it greater than nil), is not worth the cost to
popular government that judicial review surely involves.
Stated thus, Tushnet's case sounds a good deal less algorith-
mic-in that sense, less compelling-than it does in the form I gave it
earlier: that, since we can't conclude with any confidence that
constitutional values are any better served in the presence than in
the absence ofjudicial review, the democratic default should lead us
to reject judicial review. Perhaps, though, the two forms of state-
ment are not at odds. Tushnet may believe-I've been saying that I
gather he does believe-that judicial review, at least arguably, has
a better overall chance than has populist constitutional law of
getting the right answers to issues such as the permissibility of flag-
desecration laws, but that doesn't have to mean he thinks judicial
review has any better chance of getting constitutional values right,
because flag-desecration laws don't have to raise any question of
"constitutional values" in the limit sense-the "thin" sense-in which
Tushnet would have us understand that term.
D. The Calculus of Thinness
"[T]he thinness of the populist Constitution," Tushnet writes, "is
essential if the position I am developing is to be at all defensible."93
We are in a position, now, not only to see why he is right to say so,
but also to add that he means not just the thinness of the populist
constitution but its natural-law basis. The two aspects are tightly
linked in Tushnet's argument. If you are going to tout a country's
constitution as self-enforcing through a structure of incentives
resting finally on the value-based incentives of the country's
citizenry, then, true, it had better be a thin constitution you are
talking about, but equally it had better be a naturalistic one.
A naturalistically thin constitution plausibly has two properties,
crucial to incentive-compatibility, that positivistically thick
constitutions seem bound to lack: First, violations are relatively
clearly observable, as constitutionally sensitive events, by ordinary,
nonlawyer citizens.94 Second, clear violations are strongly unwel-
93. Id. at 13.
94. See id. at 127 (suggesting that it's when constitutional values are "easy to grasp" that
people most dependably will punish their representatives for violations); id. at 168 ("We
might find that we did not need the courts' help... if... the Constitution outside the courts
is relatively simple and understandable.... [Tihe Declaration's principles... provide the
480
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come to most ordinary citizens, who can accordingly be expected to
use their electoral franchise to resist them.95 Taken together, these
two properties make it quite persuasively arguable that judicial
review can do nothing much to reduce the incidence ofthin-constitu-
tional violations. And then, even leaving open the possibility that
judicial review actually does do something more to curb thick-
constitutional violations, the stage may be well-set for the demo-
cratic default to tilt the overall balance against judicial review. It
will be, as long as one agrees with Tushnet's further assessment
that thin-constitutional violations are, as a class, much likelier than
thick-constitutional violations to involve serious setbacks for human
rights.96 As Tushnet, at one point, sums up the case:
Preserving judicial review to deal with extreme cases ...
means allowing it in ordinary cases. And that has costs ....
In the end we have to decide whether on balance the risk [that
the people themselves would tolerate] extreme cases and the
possibility of successful resistance [byjudges] is great enough
to justify routine judicial review. I doubt that it is."
V. REFLECTIONS
We might compare Tushnet's position with the one staked out in
what may be the most recent writing prior to Tushnet's to speak of
constitutional-legal "thinness," Lawrence Sager's fine and important
1993 essay, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
Constitutional Law.98 Sager began with the thought that the
demands imposed on government by what he called "constitutional
case law,"99 or "constitutional adjudication,"'00 stop well short of the
model.").
95. See id. at 12 ("Politicians believe, probably correctly, that their constituents care
about the thin Constitution.... [P]oliticians become cautious when they worry that enough
constituents care enough."); id. at 70-71 (affirming that "the people are not committed to the
Constitution's principles as the courts have understood them," while denying that "the people
... have become so degenerate that the principles of the Declaration of Independence no
longer mean anything to us").
96. See id. at 13 ("The Declaration and the Preamble provide the substantive criteria for
identifying the people's vital interests."); id. at 127 (questioning whether there is really any
reason for anyone to be "deeply committed to the details of the thick Constitution we actually
have").
97. Id. at 163.
98. Lawrence Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410 (1993).
99. Id. at 410.
100. Id. at 419.
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demands imposed by what he called "political justice." 1 ' Sager's
main examples were: (1) the post-Lochner °2 withdrawal of adjudica-
tion from the sphere of social and economic rights, which means that
not only freedom of contract but rights to subsistence, health care,
and education are left to the tender mercies of legislative
majorities;10 3 (2) the "state action" doctrine, which means that
constitutional duties to refrain from racial and other class-based
discrimination are bnly very exceptionally imposed on
nongovernmental agents;1 4 and (3) the general declination of courts
to require even government actors affirmatively to correct and
compensate for current gross inequities owing to a long history of
viciously unjust discrimination by both government and (dominant)
society at large.
0 5
Sager is very sure these doctrines systematically write a great
deal of actual injustice off the adjudicative calendar. His purpose,
however, in pointing this out isn't to raise a hue and cry about it.
His interest in the facts he reports is a normative one, to be sure,
but only in a somewhat removed sense. His article poses a choice
between two possible ways, conceptually, of meting out the gap
between the reach of constitutional adjudication and the concerns
of political justice. It then asks which of the two ways is the more
normatively satisfying.0 6
Somewhere between constitutional case law and political justice,
Sager points out-following up on an earlier article on which Tushnet
relies' 07-there stands the Constitution and the norms it contains.' °
It could be that the courts, more or less deliberately, and with the
more or less conscious backing of the country, are declining to tell
the government what to do about certain demands on government
conduct that no one ought to doubt the Constitution really means to
impose. If so, then the gap between adjudication and justice is
partible into two fractions: a sub-gap between adjudication and
101. Id. at 410.
102. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
103. See Sager, supra note 98, at 410; see also Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1972).
104. See Sager, supra note 98, at 411; see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972).
105. See Sager, supra note 98, at 411; see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
106. See Sager, supra note 98, at 414-15.
107. See Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978); see also TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 170.
108. See Sager, supra note 98, at 435.
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constitutional norms, and an adjacent, complementary sub-gap
between constitutional norms and justice. Taking both the case law
and the minimum demands of justice to be fixed points, Sager's
question is how we ought to regard the Constitution's relative
proximity to the one and the other. He asks whether we get a
normatively more attractive picture by placing the Constitution
close to justice, thus assigning the lion's share of the total case
law/justice gap to judicial under-enforcement of the Constitution, or,
conversely, by placing the Constitution close to the case law, thus
attributing the case law/justice gap mainly to the Constitution's own
understatement of the demands of justice.
Sager's answer is: better to chalk up the total gap mainly to
judicial under-enforcement of the Constitution's justice-seeking
norms. 1 9 The most normatively attractive explanation for the case
law/justice gap, he says, lies in the value we rightly assign to
"popular participation in the definition and implementation of
justice.""0 But when we look to see why we value such popular
participation, the reasons we find simply are not reasons for wishing
or understanding our political charter to have set its sights short of
the full realization of political justice. Of course, we have important
disagreements about what the realization of justice means in
practice, but those shouldn't keep us from agreeing that our
Constitution ought to commit us to trying the best we can to figure
it out and then do it. Awareness of such disagreements does,
however, combine with a care for popular participation to yield a
strong reason for "restraining the reach of constitutional adjudica-
tion," that is, in order to allow due room for "robust participation by
popular institutions in the constitutional project of identifying and
implementing the elements of political justice.""'
That sounds a lot like Tushnet. And it is. And it isn't. To put the
difference as plainly, if over-simplistically, as I can: Whereas Sager's
contraction of the province of constitutional adjudication is meant
to shore up a background conviction that judicial review is a highly
desirable component in a governance system geared to "the project
of identifring and implementing the elements of justice over
109. See id. at 414-19.
110. Id. at 418.
111. Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
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time,"112 Tushnet's thin constitutionalism is meant to shore up an
argument that it is not.
The view Sager takes of the presumptive merits of judicial
supremacy is just the one Tushnet spends a book trying to unseat.
Sager starts with the view, and never deserts it, that an independ-
ent judiciary has clear advantages over popularly elected assemblies
in the "judgment-driven" (as opposed to "preference-driven") work
of finding justice-serving answers to questions of constitutional
interpretation and application. 1 3 He notices, however, that certain
"elements of political justice" cannot be pursued without deciding
lots of closely connected questions, not themselves matters of
justice, that are nevertheless of great and legitimate concern to a
country's people-matters of strategy, responsibility, and institu-
tional arrangement."' The elements of justice most saliently
displaying this property of coming tightly bundled with important
non-justice considerations are just the ones, Sager says, where the
extant case law/justice gap is most noticeable: positive social and
economic rights, affirmative correction of current social conditions
resulting from past injustice, and extensions of corrective obliga-
tions to various nongovernmental actors." 5
The general idea is that whoever undertakes to deal responsibly
with the "justice" elements in these bundles will have to deal with
the rest of the bundles, too. These are whole balls of wax, best dealt
with in their entireties either by the courts or by the political
branches. If we have some very good reason not to want the courts
messing with the non-justice parts of these balls of wax, that would
explain why we, exceptionally, exclude them from dealing with the
justice elements the balls of wax contain. That gives
Sager-unmistakably a committed defender, in general, of American-
style judicial review-an opening through which to make his peace
with the party of popular self-government. Although one could
certainly, and without great difficulty, imagine an appointive,
independent judiciary commissioned to decide whatever non-justice
questions may come bundled with justice questions, Sager is
prepared, out of a due regard for the values of popular self-govern-
ment, to assign the ball-of-wax cases, in their entireties, to the
112. Id.
113. See id. at 414-16 & n.6.
114. Id. at 418-19.
115. See id. at 420-21, 427-28.
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political branches." 6 If you want to see graphically how this differs
from Tushnet, consider that there is no ball of wax around the
question of the constitutional permissibility of flag-burning.
But of course the difference between Sager's and Tushnet's
positions is profounder than that. Sager, committed in general to
judicial supremacy in the pursuit ofjustice wrapped as constitution-
alism, "justice in plain clothes,""' nevertheless approves a certain
thinning out-a certain reining in-of constitutional case law so as to
open a space for claims of rights of popular self-government.
Tushnet, working to undermine Sager-ish convictions of the
pragmatic advantages of American-style judicial review in the
pursuit of justice alias constitutional law, finds himself pressed by
the needs of that work to thin out the notion of justice itself, or at
least that part of it to be pursued as constitutional law.
To end there, with Tushnet thinning down justice only in order to
make it fit his incentive-compabibilist argument against the
pragmatic advantages of judicial review, would be to do a serious
injustice to Tushnet. He has, as well, an affirmative argument for
a thin conception of constitutional values, one that flows directly
from his background commitment to self-government, quite without
regard to any argument against the utility of judicial review.
It is one thing to say that ordinary, acculturated Americans can
discern abnegations from the value-commitments of the Declaration
and the Preamble. It does not follow that we always have discerned
or always do discern what we are capable of discerning, or that we
always act politically according to what we discern. In fact, never to
this day have we nearly always done so, nor are we ever likely to
finish the job. The thin Constitution is, in Tushnet's words, "a
project, that is, a self-creating activity in which the people of the
United States daily decide whether to continue to pursue the course
we have been pursuing."18 And-here is the point-the space thus
opened for self-creation through self-government is itself a part of
the beauty of the thin Constitution. Political participation and self-
government are, in Tushnet's view, ranking human values in
themselves (in some way weightier, it would seem, for him than
they are for Sager), and the values reach their highest pitch when
116. See id. at 435.
117. Sager, supra note 98.
118. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 183.
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the issues on the table are those of "national self-definition."" 9
Issues of national self-definition are not identifiable by whether they
do or do not come surrounded by a ball of wax. Such issues include
the permissibility of a flag-desecration law, 2 ° but Tushnet would
surely agree that they include, as well, such questions as those of
what we do about satisfying everyone's basic material needs,' 2' and
what we do about affirmative action.'22 These questions of justice
that are also questions of national self-definition are precisely the
questions that arise in that space of reasonable disagreement over
concrete applications of the thin Constitution's abstractions, from
which judicial review and its overhang are constant threats to crowd
out popular government.
In sum, the distance between Tushnet and Sager lies partly, but
only partly, in their differing beliefs about the relative trustworthi-
ness of judicial review and populist constitutional law in getting to
the true resolutions of the matters in reasonable disagreement. The
rest lies in their differing assignments of value to direct popular
involvement in the process of conscientious, judgment-driven
decision (higher for Tushnet) and to getting the resolutions right
(higher for Sager). In Tushnet's view, justice is not done, but neither
do the heavens fall, if populist constitutional law mistakenly allows
punishment of flag-burners, and the loss is more than made up for
by the moral gain of letting every American into the process of "all-
things-considered judgment"'23 guided by a sincere and not unrea-
sonable vision of the principles of the thin Constitution.'2'
There remains one more thing, and not a minor one, that Tushnet
must be asking us to believe. Tushnet maintains that if only we
envision constitutional values as sufficiently, naturalistically thin,
Americans can be counted on to stand up for them at crunch time.
119. See id. at 190-93.
120. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1988). In Johnson, the Court explained that its
decision against the constitutionality of the Texas flag-desecration statute reaffirms
the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and...
the conviction that our tolera[nce] ... is a sign and source of our strength ....
[The image] immortalized in our... national anthem, is of the bombardment
[the flag] survived at Fort McHenry. It is the Nation's resilience, not its rigidity,
that Texas sees reflected in the flag - and it is that resilience that we reassert
today.
Id. at 419.
121. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 183.
122. See id. at 185.
123. Id. at 51-53, 91.
124. See id. at 51.
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But it turns out, to the kind of hard look we have taken, that by
standing up for constitutional values, Tushnet does not mean
getting them right any particular fraction of the time. He means
trying, in the right spirit, to get them right, approaching them in the
idealized, liberal-humanist spirit of the Declaration. What"matters"
about the political treatment of flag-burning, or of California's
nativist Proposition 187, "is not primarily how controversy... is
resolved, but the terms in which it is discussed."125 No matter that
Tushnet himself does not think these cases are "even... close." 26
As long as fair-minded people, honestly committed to the abstract
values of the Declaration, "at least as aspirations," could conclude
otherwise, then outcomes of otherwise are no sign of a distempered
world.
127
That may be more than some of Tushnet's liberal-minded readers
will find they can swallow. For myself, I think he asks of us about
what John Rawls does in his most recent explanations of the idea of
public reason. 12' But that is matter for another essay.1
21
125. Id. at 193.
126. Id. at 106.
127. Id. at 106, 127.
128. See JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in COLLECTED PAPERS 573
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
129. I plan to pursue the comparison in my forthcoming Storrs Lectures on "The Essential
Constitution."
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